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Contextualism is the epistemological thesis that holds context to significantly affect the truth 
value of claims such as “S knows that p.”   A shift in context can lead to a shift in the standards 
by which we evaluate propositional knowledge claims, and thus a shift in the truth values of 
these claims: a statement “S knows that  p” may be true when evaluated in one context while 
simultaneously false when evaluated in another context.  A contextualist says it is by playing on 
these  shifting  standards  that  the  skeptic  manages  to  destroy  knowledge  with  her  skeptical 
arguments.  Once this is understood, the contextualist holds, we can see that skeptical arguments 
like those of external world skepticism do not threaten our ordinary knowledge.  
In this thesis I argue that if contextualism is as successful as it claims, then it should be 
possible to use the techniques of contextualism to solve skeptical problems other than those with 
which the contextualist is usually concerned; namely it should be possible to solve the problem 
of  induction.    Taking  Stewart  Cohen’s  relevant  alternatives derived  contextualism  as  my 
representative, I show that it is possible to construct such a solution consistent with the tenets of 
contextualism, but that in doing so certain troubling question-begging assumptions are shown in 
sharp relief, invalidating the proposed solution.  In the end we are left with the question: Can a 
relevant alternatives contextualism successfully solve any skeptical argument without a proper 
solution to the problem of induction?
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Introduction
Contextualism in epistemology attempts to defuse skeptical  challenges to  knowledge claims, 
usually those challenges concerning knowledge of the external world.  There are many different 
contextualist  approaches  to  this  task,  but  we  can  conceive  of  contextualism  in  general  as 
preserving our intuitions about having knowledge by arguing that a skeptical challenge only 
appears to endanger everyday knowledge claims because of shifts in epistemic standards that 
accompany shifts in types of conversational contexts.1  What “to know” means in one situation is 
different, the contextualist holds, than what “to know” means in another situation: knowledge for 
a  contextualist  is  thus completely relative to contexts  of knowledge attribution.   Once these 
shifting standards are recognized, the contextualist argues, we can see that the truthfulness of a 
knowledge claim depends on the standards determined by different contexts.  The skeptic may 
well be correct in denying a knowledge claim in the stringent environment created by skeptical 
issues,  but  the  contextualist  counters  that  when we are  in  ordinary,  everyday,  non-skeptical 
contexts, the truthfulness of the same claim is upheld.  Contextualists conclude that our normal 
knowledge claims are in the end safeguarded from the threat of skepticism.
The skeptical  problem about  the external  world is  a familiar  fixture in epistemology. 
Modern philosophy is traced to Descartes’ meditations where he explored the possibility of being 
deceived by an evil  god-like genius into holding beliefs about an external world that do not 
correlate with the way things actually are.  Our senses are on occasion deceived in rather trivial 
ways—a stick appearing bent in water, hallucinations, dreams,  etc.  Descartes recognized that 
from these examples it follows that it is possible to be deceived all of the time.  And not being 
able to rule out this possibility, it appears one cannot be fully justified in asserting the contrary; 
i.e., that things are as they seem.  Descartes appealed to a benevolent creator to escape potential 
solipsism.  This argument, though, is widely seen as folly.  Numerous subsequent attempts to 
justify  beliefs  about  an  external  world  have  followed  Descartes.   None,  however,  has  won 
widespread acclaim.
The contextualist attempt to disarm external world skepticism appeals to the supposed 
relative nature of “to know” in order to secure our knowledge claims about the external world. 
In a very skeptical context the standards for knowledge are very high—impossibly high, says the 
contextualist—rendering any claim based on the existence of the external world false.  On the 
other hand, the same claim—all things being equal—is seen to be true in a context with much 
lower standards, for it reaches these lower standards. 
Note, though, the following premise in the contextualist argument:  our everyday claims 
to knowledge are safe when they are examined in the light of a non-skeptical context.  Aside 
from appeals to common sense and ordinary language use, this claim is offered without any 
support.  “No doubt some will feel it is ad hoc,” admits the contextualist Stewart Cohen.  But, 
Cohen maintains, all one “can hope for is a workable option that enables us to avoid skepticism. 
We avail ourselves of that option for no other reason than we want to avoid skepticism.2  Cohen 
has stated elsewhere that contextualism only has purchase “if we are antecedently convinced of 
the falsity of skepticism.”3  By this account, the falsity of skepticism (the “ad hoc” option) is 
1 James Pryor characterizes contextualism as “the doctrine that the truth of a knowledge-ascription can vary with the 
context in which that ascription is made or assessed.” James Pryor, “Highlights of Recent Epistemology,” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001): 100.
2 Stewart Cohen, “Knowledge and Context,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 582.
3 Stewart Cohen “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 
83.
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used as an explicit premise in the contextualist attempt to safeguard knowledge from the threat of 
skepticism.  Again, Cohen: “But doesn’t this just beg the question against the skeptic?  In a sense 
it does, but no more than the skeptic begs the question against common sense.”4  Leaving aside 
whether or not one can justifiably beg the question, I’d like to examine how it is that one can 
view contextualism as question-begging and look at what this might show us about their project.5
Many philosophers have taken issue with that which the contextualist approach helps 
itself in order to accomplish its task. Contextualism’s detractors have examined various points of 
contention—contextualism’s  irrelevance  to  epistemological  problems  (Kornblith),6 its 
unsupportable  semantics  (Schiffer),7 its  concern  with  meta-linguistics  as  opposed  to 
epistemology (Sosa),8 and  its  presumption  of  semantic  support  for  knowing as  an  indexical 
(Stanley)9 among other concerns.  Here I’d like to demonstrate how the contextualist question-
begging  approach  becomes  acutely  evident—and  philosophically  interesting—when  their 
techniques and analyses, developed as a response to the skeptical problem of the external world, 
are applied to another important skeptical argument, the problem of induction.  I  will take a 
particular form of contextualism, as offered by Stewart Cohen, and see how it might be taken to 
provide a solution to the problem of induction.  We will  see that his  contextualist  approach 
explicitly begs the question in regards to the problem of induction. This question-begging will 
show  in  sharp  relief  the  question-begging  inherent  in  Cohen’s  approach  to  external  world 
skepticism and suggest  that  question-begging is  a  greater  problem than Cohen or  any  other 
contextualist has heretofore recognized.
The structure of my project is as follows: I begin with the problem of the external world 
(in “External World Skepticism”) and present in detail one contextualist approach to solving 
external world skepticism (“Stewart Cohen’s Contextualist Response to EWS”); I then lay out 
the problem of induction (in “The Problem of Induction”); following this I detail a contextualist 
solution to that problem based on Cohen’s work and then weigh the efficacy of such a solution 
(in  “A  Contextualist  Solution  to  the  Problem  of  Induction”).   Here  we  see  the  problems 
generated by this approach, at which point I will examine the implications of my project.
4 Stewart Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 113.
5 For  philosophers  who  embrace  contextualism,  what  I  am  suggesting  is  question-begging  is  decidedly 
uncontroversial.  It’s as matter-of-fact as the common sense and ordinary language that is contextualism’s starting 
point.   The larger question is  ultimately whether  the linguistic concerns of contextualism have any bearing on 
epistemological concerns.
6 Hilary Kornblith, “The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology,” Philosophical Issues (Nous) 10 (2000).
7 Stephen Schiffer, “Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 317-
333.
8 Ernest Sosa, “Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 139-155.
9 Jason Stanley, “Context and Logical Form,” Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2000): 391-434.
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External World Skepticism
External world skepticism (EWS) denies one can have knowledge of an external world, where 
knowledge of the external world consists of having a justified, true belief10 with regard to some 
proposition concerning a world existing outside of the experience of the mind (e.g., that there are 
people; that in the United States fire trucks are often red; that my office is cold today; or even, 
that there exists an external world).  More precisely, EWS is the position according to which, if p 
is any proposition concerning an external world, no subject S does not know p.
The EWS skeptic presses for sufficient reason to grant that a subject has knowledge of an 
external world—reason the skeptic maintains lies well beyond the reach of the putative knower. 
In general, a would-be knower cites sensation-based evidence as grounds for knowledge of an 
external world—“I know something about some object or attribute because I have experienced it 
through sight, smell, taste, touch, etc”: a subject relies upon the subjective phenomena of sensory 
experience  to  justify  her  beliefs  about  an  objective  external  world.   The  skeptic  asks  for 
justification for the leap from this mental experience to claims about a world external to the 
mind: seeing flames, feeling the warmth of burning wood, smelling charred logs, and hearing the 
crackle associated with a fire are insufficient, says the EWS skeptic, for claiming knowledge that 
there’s a fire nearby.
In his first Meditations, Descartes presents what has become the traditional argument for 
EWS.11  Descartes sought to secure knowledge in light of skeptical challenge.  To do so, he 
systematically examined what was taken to be evidence for knowledge claims and evaluated the 
threats levied against that evidence. In the text, Descartes is first troubled with the possibility of 
illusions—if one has been mistaken before, why not now?—and then raises the stakes with the 
potential of a subject dreaming; as Descartes continues his project, the stakes are continuously 
raised and security of knowledge correspondingly lessened—more and more the relationship 
between what we think we know and what is actually the case is called into question.   
Descartes’ evil genius emerges at the apex of these threats: instead of individual cases of 
perceptual knowledge,  the evil  genius threatens knowledge of  the external  world taken as a 
whole—all instances of knowledge of the external world—conceptual as well as perceptual—
whether or not one can have knowledge of an external world in any capacity.  To perform such a 
task, the evil genius orchestrates events so that a subject’s phenomenal life appears just as it 
would were the subject actually experiencing an external world.  This of course results in an 
10 I  am here  ignoring  Gettier  cases,  situations  of  “accidental”  knowledge  that  satisfy  the  traditional  tripartite 
conditions for knowledge (i.e., justified true belief).  In a Gettier case, I may believe something that is true and have 
justification for that true belief, but the justification is based on reasons that don’t justify the belief in the way we 
think justification ought to do so: our justification seems to work by accident by accident.  Say I have the true belief 
that someone in my office plays the cello and has recently purchased one of these instruments (belief.  My belief is 
based on the following reasons: I notice a coworker has begun to carry cello scores around; I see that she has a cello 
in the back of her car; and I overhear her mention the going rate for a cello to another colleague.  Now, it is actually 
the case that this colleague has not recently purchased a cello—she merely rents one—and does not even play one: 
the one in her car is for her child, she checks out scores for her child on her lunch break, and she is aware of the  
prices for a decent cello because she cannot afford one for her child.  But, as it turns out, another colleague, one I  
wouldn’t even suspect has any interest in music, has purchased and begun to play the cello.  The problem that arises 
is that I have the true belief that there’s a cello player in my office who recently acquired a new cello, and I have 
justification for this true belief, but it seems counter-intuitive to call this knowledge, as the justification seems the 
wrong sort, and the true belief accidental.  I recognize the importance of Gettier cases, but they need not factor in to 
my project. 
11 Rene Descartes.  Selected Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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apparent—albeit mistaken—justification for beliefs about that apparent external world.  If the 
world appears to us as though it has the features we normally take the world to have, we readily 
respond by thinking it legitimate to hold beliefs about the world and make knowledge claims to 
the effect that things are as they appear.  Seeing that we would still maintain claims about a 
world even when that world did not even exist (outside of the inspirations of the evil genius), it 
becomes clear that we lack justification for our beliefs and any claims we might make about an 
external world.  And so, in demonstrating the insecurity of a subject’s sensory-based knowledge, 
the evil genius scenario raises the threat of EWS. 
Hilary  Putnam  provides  an  updated  version  of  EWS  with  a  “brain-in-a-vat”  (BIV) 
scenario.  The BIV scenario has become the subject of and platform for much philosophical 
debate concerning EWS and as such the argument based on the BIV scenario is the argument to 
disarm in the contemporary landscape of epistemological skepticism.  Quite simply, BIV is the 
Cartesian evil genius scenario  sans evil genius—as we’ll see, technology plays the role here. 
Putnam invites us to entertain the scenario that—independently of an evil-genius-like agent—
brains-in-vats have arisen through certain cosmological events to become the status quo: brains-
in-vats that have always, for as long as they’ve been brains at all, been brains-in-vats, i.e. brains 
that have never been embodied.  In this scenario, the brains’
nerve endings [are] connected to a super-scientific computer which 
causes the [brains] to have the illusion that everything is perfectly 
normal. There seem to be people,  objects,  the  sky,  etc.;  but 
really, all the [brains are] experiencing is the result of electronic 
impulses traveling from the computer to the nerve endings.12
The argument that results from this scenario is a non-agential argument with the same driving 
point as the Cartesian scenario: a subject S cannot rule out that she is a brain suspended in a vat 
of nutrients electrochemically stimulated so as to produce a simulation of an external world—all 
of her sensory experiences, memories, etc. are the result of this stimulation, so she cannot get 
“outside” of this information to verify its source, and as a result she has no grounds to rule out a 
scenario such as being a BIV; but, if S doesn’t know she’s not a BIV, then S doesn’t know the 
things we would take her to know were she not a BIV (such as whether she has hands or not); 
one can therefore conclude, it seems, that S does not know she has hands.  Let’s unpack this a 
little and see how the BIV scenario and its related argument give us EWS.  
I rely upon the sum of the sensations I am currently experiencing—the sound of the air 
conditioner, the color of the flowers outside my window, the feel of my back against my chair, a 
soreness  in  my  hands,  even  a  general  sense  of  hunger—to situate  myself  bodily  within  an 
external world.  This world I take to consist of things that reasonably correspond with these 
sensations; in this case, I take it that I am in my office late Sunday morning.  Colors, sounds, 
bodily sensations—these all suggest to me that there are things external to my mind that have the 
very attributes of color, timbre, etc. that I take to cause my mental sensations—I feel a keyboard 
with my hands, I see that my typing brings words to the screen, I can see fleshy protuberances 
dangling in front of me—with all of this, I feel it reasonable to assert that it is by virtue of having 
hands that I experience this sensory information.  But, all the same, it seems I cannot rule out the 
possibility that I am actually only a brain-in-a-vat which is being fed information in a way other 
than by contact with the world as I experience it.   And if I were only a brain, then it is clear I 
12 Hilary Putnam,  Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1981), 6-7.
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would have no body, and with no body I would have no hands.  So, given I can’t rule out that 
I’m merely a brain, it seems to follow that I do not know I have hands.  Also, I therefore do not 
have any justification  for  my belief  that  I  am in my office  on Sunday.   Indeed,  I  have  no 
justification for  any claims to knowledge concerning the external world.  In fact, it appears I 
should be skeptical of anyone having justified knowledge of an external world at all.
These two EWS arguments,  viz. the Cartesian evil genius argument and the argument 
based  on  the  BIV  scenario,  are  obviously  very  similar—so  similar  in  fact  these  sorts  of 
arguments share a structural form: 
P1. S does not know that not-H.
P2. If S does not know that not-H, then S does not know that O.
C.  S does not know that O.
Following Keith DeRose, we can call these types of arguments “Arguments from Ignorance” 
(AI), a name that notes a defining feature of these arguments, i.e. that we are not easily if at all 
able to rule out some hypothesis that if the case threatens our knowledge.13  The AI form is the 
structure contemporary theorists utilize when considering EWS arguments.  Accordingly it will 
be useful for us to have the argument from BIV in this form.  Here is the BIV argument mapped 
onto the schematic structure of AI: 
P1.  I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.
P2.  If I do not know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
C.  I don’t know that I have hands.
Responses to EWS
EWS has prompted a range of responses.  These responses tend to seize on one element of the AI 
argument—either a premise or the conclusion: G.E. Moore, for instance, denies the conclusion 
outright, appealing to an intuitive sense of its absurdity—“here are my hands.”  Putnam denied 
the  first  premise,  his  argument  based  on  semantic  externalism:  on  his  view,  the  nature  of 
language, reference, and meaning precludes a scenario such as BIV.  Fred Dretske and Robert 
Nozick—both holders of a relevant alternatives view of knowledge—deny the second premise, 
the  conditional  that  leads  to  the  conclusion;  they  see  this  conditional  as  an  instance  of  the 
“closure  principle,”  and  in  the  face  of  an  argument  that  otherwise  seems  compelling,  feel 
obligated  to  deny  this  principle  in  order  to  deny  the  skeptic.14  All  of  these  responses  are 
characterized by an outright denial of one of EWS’s premises or its very conclusion or some 
combination thereof.  These responses are generally known as “Moorean” responses following 
Moore’s example.
Contextualism, which we will explore in greater detail in the next section, takes the non-
Moorean approach that each of the members of the argument is acceptable—at least intuitively in 
the sense we don’t appear to have grounds to deny them—but that a consideration of the contexts 
13 Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1. DeRose elsewhere refers to 
arguments  like  these  as  “arguments  from  skeptical  hypothesis”  Keith  DeRose,  “Introduction:  Responding  to 
Skepticism,” in Skepticism: a contemporary reader, ed. DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted A. (New York: Oxford, 
1999). 
14 For a discussion of both Dretske and Nozick, see DeRose’s introduction to Skepticism: a contemporary reader: 
Keith DeRose, “Responding to Skepticism,” 18.  
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in which they are evaluated will clarify how arguments like BIV operate and thus allow us to 
disarm them.  Once these types of arguments are properly understood, the contextualists hold 
that they no longer pose a threat to our ordinary knowledge claims.  
 
6
Stewart Cohen’s Contextualist Response to EWS
We sometimes have conflicting intuitions about what counts as knowledge: we find ourselves in 
situations  in  which  two  or  more  propositions,  while  independently  plausible,  appear  to  be 
contradictory when considered together.   Situations of this  type motivate  an epistemological 
response that explains these contradictions while satisfying general intuitions on what counts as 
knowledge: epistemological contextualism is such a response.  In this section, I explain the types 
of problems that recommend a contextualist approach by way of Fred Dretske’s painted mules 
scenario, where the difficulty of knowing whether zebra are or are not painted mules brings 
conflicting  intuitions  to  the  fore.15  Taking  Stewart  Cohen’s  relevant  alternatives  derived 
contextualism as my contextualist representative, I then demonstrate the contextualist approach 
to solving such an epistemic quandary: roughly that S knows that p depending on the context in 
which knowledge is ascribed.  Finally, the contextualist approach to the painted mules case is 
applied to the BIV scenario—giving us a contextualist response to EWS. 
Painted Mules
Dretske’s painted mules scenario illustrates the sort of conflicting intuitions about knowledge 
with which we’re here concerned.  If a zoogoer in front of a cage containing black and white 
striped, hoofed quadrupeds accompanied by a placard reading “zebra” claims “I know these are 
zebra” it seems prima facie a true statement: we can count it as knowledge.  If another person 
standing  nearby  were  to  overhear  the  zoogoer,  we  would  expect  this  person  to  ascribe  the 
zoogoer’s propositional knowledge claim with the truth value “true”: it is the case that S (the 
zoogoer) knows that p (that these animals are zebra).  And this seems unproblematic.
But things can get tricky: animals that look like zebra can possibly be painted mules. 
However unlikely, this alternative hypothesis to the animals actually being zebra is a distinct 
possibility until it is satisfactorily ruled out.  The particularly tricky part, as Dretske observes, is 
that an alternative hypothesis like this characteristically plays on the neutrality of the available 
evidence: the evidence both supports the alternative hypothesis (these animals are painted mules) 
as well as the more obvious conclusion (the animals are zebra)—the evidence is  neutralized.16 
Cohen adds that the alternative hypothesis is  immune to repudiation by appeal to this shared 
(thus neutralized) evidence for thinking the more pedestrian claim; the alternative hypothesis has 
immunity due to the evidence’s neutrality.17
Imagine that the particular zoo our zoogoer is visiting is run by a  nefarious zookeeper, 
one who only yesterday dispatched a henchman to replace the zebras with painted mules.  The 
nefarious zookeeper, eavesdropping from his secret hideout as the zoogoer claims to know that 
the animals are  zebra,  exclaims:  “That  statement is  false—those are  not  zebra.”   This is  an 
interesting development: the zoogoer’s statement, formerly true, is now clearly false—he does 
not  know  that  the  animals  are  zebra.   But,  unbeknownst  to  the  nefarious  zookeeper,  his 
15 Fred Dretske,  “Epistemic Operators” in Skepticism: a contemporary reader, ed. Keith DeRose and Ted Warfield, 
138 (New York: Oxford, 1999).
16 Dretske, 138.
17 Cohen,  “Contextualist  Solutions  to  Epistemological  Prolems:  Skepticism,  Gettier,  and  the  Lottery,”  67. 
Elsewhere, DeRose, after Nozick, characterizes these hypothesizes as having the effect that you would still  not 
believe them if they were true: one would still believe the zebra in the cage were zebra even if the alternative was 
true.  This is termed the sensitivity of a belief: how amenable is the belief to contrary evidence establishes its 
sensitivity.  This can be seen to play on the immunity/neutrality characteristic.  This issue of the sensitivity of a 
belief is discussed in DeRose,  “Responding to Skepticism,” 18.
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henchman couldn’t bring himself to perpetrate such zoological fraud—the zebra are zebra after 
all.  The henchman overhears the nefarious zookeeper and thinks: “Well, the nefarious zookeeper 
is incorrect, those are zebra, but it’s not clear that the zoogoer is correct either—it may be the 
case that they are zebra, but they were almost painted mules, and it’s odd to say someone knows 
something when it seems so by accident.”18  
In this scenario, the same propositional knowledge claim (the zoogoer knows the animals 
to be zebra) has shifted through a range of truth values without any fact of the matter having 
changed.   The  zebra  never  stopped being  zebra—rather  we moved through various  vantage 
points and saw how the truth-values of a knowledge claim about the zebra were affected by 
virtue of the situation. 
One propositional claim being both true and false is problematic for an epistemic view—
indeed a contradiction in any area of philosophy asks for some scrutiny.  Recognizing that an 
epistemological  view should  not  casually  assent  to  inherent  contradictions,  we  can  see  that 
dissolving the painted mules case would recommend an epistemological viewpoint that could do 
so.  Cohen’s relevant alternatives-based contextualism promises to be able to do just that. 
The  relevant  alternatives  (RA)  elements  of  Cohen’s  view explain  how knowledge is 
destroyed in a scenario such as painted mules.  Given a zoogoer’s usual situation—visiting a zoo 
not run by a nefarious zookeeper—a knowledge claim that S knows that animals are zebra can be 
taken to be true, despite the possibility that these animals could be painted mules. In general, we 
don’t have to rule out such an outlandish claim—the alternative just simply is not relevant, and 
due to its irrelevance, there is no need to consider it in light of evaluating a knowledge claim.   
For Cohen, an alternative is relevant if a subject S is in an epistemic position where an 
alternative to p would prevent S knowing  p.19 On Cohen’s view, relevance is determined by 
statistics:  the probability  of  an event  or  situation occurring determines  its  relevance. 20  For 
example, if you come across a barn in the countryside, the possibility of that barn being a replica 
made of papier-mâché is generally absurd enough to be irrelevant.  But if there was a big-budget 
blockbuster  about  barn-burning  being  filmed  in  the  area,  then  the  alternative  takes  on  a 
significant relevance due to its statistically significant possibility.  And for Cohen, that relevance 
can (at least theoretically) be determined computationally by factoring in the ratio of fake barns 
to real barns in the area and other related information.  
Now, there is a flipside to the issue of statistically determined relevance: an alternative 
can be  made relevant by drawing a subject’s attention to a hitherto irrelevant alternative—one 
can make an irrelevant alternative hypothesis relevant by making the alternative salient.  21  For 
example, given a fair lottery, to say “I know this is a losing lottery ticket” before there has been a 
drawing seems intuitively false: one doesn’t seem to  know a ticket is a losing ticket until the 
drawing is actually held—people who buy lottery tickets do so because they know there’s some 
probability that a ticket is a winning ticket.  At first this appears to be a problem for Cohen’s 
theory of statistically-determined relevance—there is a very low probability that the ticket is a 
winning ticket (and note that we can make the probability as low as we like by manipulating the 
total number of tickets), but yet it  is still a very relevant alternative (people buy tickets so that 
they  might  win)—but  actually  this  seemingly  paradoxical  situation  illustrates  quite  nicely 
18 This could more clearly made to be an example of a Gettier case.
19 Black,  Tim.  “Contextualism  in  Epistemology,”  The  Internet  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/contextu.htm (Accessed September 2004).
20 Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” 106
21 Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” 106
8
Cohen’s rule of salience: an otherwise irrelevant alternative can be made relevant by drawing a 
subject’s attention to that alternative.22
Statistically-determined relevance and the rule of salience serve to explain the conflicting 
intuitions about what is true in the painted mules scenario.  For a zoogoer visiting a zoo not run 
by a nefarious zookeeper the probability of zebra being painted mules is extremely low—low 
enough not to endanger the knowledge claim “The zoogoer knows that these animals are zebra.” 
In a scenario where the nefarious zookeeper periodically replaces animals with painted stand-ins, 
however, this becomes a relevant alternative.  First, notice that in a scenario where the nefarious 
zookeeper has replaced the zebra, we say that the probability is (clearly) high enough to make 
the alternative relevant and we clearly cannot count the zoogoer’s claim as knowledge.  But also 
notice that even when the henchman does not replace the zebra as ordered, it still seems correct 
to  deny  the  zoogoer’s  knowledge  claim:  the  zoogoer  does  not  know the  animals  are  zebra 
because he has not ruled out what is a very relevant alternative—not only could these animals be 
painted mules in some far-reaching sense, they almost were.
RA Contextualism and Preserving Closure
If relevant alternatives theory alone can explain the variety of scenarios encountered above, then 
the question arises: What recommends Cohen’s theory over RA?   Cohen’s theory can be seen to 
be preferable over RA alone on account of two features: context and closure.  For our purposes, 
context can be taken to indicate the sum of relevant elements (such as place, time, and other 
considerations)  involved  in  fixing  an  environment  of  ascription.   Closure  is  a  bit  more 
complicated a matter.  To understand the issue, we will first put the painted mules scenario into 
its AI form.   
P1.  S does not know that the zebra-like animals in the zebra cage are not cleverly painted 
mules.
P2.  If S doe not know that the zebra-like animals in the zebra cage are not painted  
mules, then S does not know that they are zebra.
C.  S does not know the zebra-like animals in the zebra cage are zebra.
The  closure principle is exhibited in P2: the principle states that to count as knowing  p  (the 
animals are zebra) when  p entails that  q (the animals are not painted mules), then you do not 
count as knowing p if you do not know q.  Dretske’s RA theory rejects “the principle that if you 
do not know that Q is true, when it is known that P entails Q, then you do not know that P is 
true.”23  Cohen, however, believes that closure “expresses something deep about the nature of 
knowledge.”24  His contextualism preserves closure while maintaining the RA approach.25
Earlier, we took the slight variations of the painted mules scenario individually—in turn 
the zoogoer, the nefarious zookeeper, and the henchman; Cohen’s contextualism accounts for 
these variations all at one instant by considering the contexts in which these knowledge claims 
are assessed, and in doing so Cohen’s theory maintains the closure principle.  The contextualist 
analysis says the zoogoer both counts as knowing  and  as not knowing the animals are zebra, 
22 Cohen “How to be a Fallibilist,” 92.
23 139 skepticism
24 Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” 64.  In addition, Cohen asks “If the closure 
principle is false, then what explains the appeal of skeptical arguments?” 
25 Cohen is following RA theorist Gail Stine in preserving closure against Dretske and Nozick, although he disagrees 
with her non-evidential-based approach (Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” 98-101).
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depending  on  the  context  in  which  knowledge is  being  ascribed.   On a  contextualist  view, 
knowledge is an indexical—it takes its meaning by virtue of the context in which it is uttered (or 
assessed), 26 the context  determining the standards for  ascription—so the same propositional 
knowledge claim can have radically different truth values depending on shifts in the contexts of 
ascription: in the context in which his statement is assessed by a bystander, the zoogoer counts as 
knowing the animals are zebra—for two unsuspecting zoogoers, the claim that these animals are 
zebra is common sense.27  In the context of the nefarious zookeeper, the zoogoer does not count 
as having knowledge, for there is now a highly relevant alternative that the zebra are painted 
mules, and as the zoogoer does not know these animals are not painted mules, he by virtue of 
closure, does not know they are zebra.  And in the henchman’s context, the zoogoer does not 
count as knowing because, although the zoogoer does hold a true belief, the belief is not properly 
justified on account of the salient possibility that has not been properly ruled out—again by 
closure, he does not count as having the knowledge in question.  
There is no over-arching fact of the matter whether or not the zoogoer has knowledge—it 
is entirely dependent on context.  And this is how Cohen preserves closure: on account of shifts 
in  context,  there  is  only  the  appearance of  closure  failure—when  the  zoogoer’s  claim  is 
evaluated in light of different epistemic standards the zoogoer both knows that  p (when the 
alternative is not relevant) and does not know that p (when the alternative is made salient)—and 
these shifts allow for closure to function dependant on different standards in different contexts. 
The  closure  principle  instantiated  in  P2  is  always  the  case,  but  only  affects  the  zoogoer’s 
knowledge claim  qua  P2 when the alternative hypothesis that the zebra are painted mules is 
under  consideration  such  as  in  P1.   But  in  an  ordinary,  everyday  context,  standards  for 
knowledge are relaxed, and closure isn’t in effect qua P2.
Painted Mules and BIV, Cohen’s Contextualism
Notice what we’ve been considering with the painted mules scenario is an instance of skeptical 
argument  and  what  we’ve  been  discussing  with  Cohen’s  contextualism  is  a  response  to  a 
skeptical argument.  It should be clear as well that the argument and the response generated are 
concerned specifically with arguments and responses of the AI form.  Another observation to be 
made is that if one skeptical  argument of the AI form (the painted mules argument) can be 
satisfactorily  overcome  through  a  certain  approach  (contextualism),  then  another  skeptical 
argument of the same form should also be susceptible to such an approach. If contextualism 
works with the painted mules skeptical argument, then it should work with an EWS argument of 
the same AI form.  In other words, contextualism should be able to provide an answer to the AI 
argument  from  the  BIV  scenario.   This  is  of  course  not  lost  on  the  contextualists,  and 
accordingly, Cohen has worked out just such an argument.  Below I will clarify the structural 
similarity of the painted mules scenario and the BIV scenario, examine the differences of these 
two situations, and explain how, just as Cohen’s contextualism works to provide a solution for 
26 For support, Cohen points to the word ‘flat’ and similar context-dependant natural predicates used in language. 
The lawn is flat in regard to whether or not it’s a good space to serve as a soccer pitch.  The lawn is not flat in regard 
to whether or not I can spin a coin on it.  Cohen says the land around Princeton is not flat, but recognizes a giant 
would disagree.   When we consider flatness ascriptions,  we quickly see different contexts – and thus different 
standards  –  for  flatness.   Flatness  simpliciter  depends  on  the  context  of  the  attribution.   According  to  the 
contextualist, ascriptions of ‘S knows that p’ likewise vary from context to context.  For them, as there is no over-
arching flatness simpliciter, there is likewise no over-arching knowledge simpliciter.
27 Cohen concludes that a “social component of knowledge…[indicates] that attributions of knowledge are context 
sensitive.”  Cohen, “Knowledge and Context,” 574.
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the painted mules argument, so in the same way does it provide a solution to the BIV scenario, 
and thus EWS.
We can see that the two skeptical arguments from BIV and the painted mules scenarios 
are  structurally  similar  in  that  they  are  both  arguments  of  the  AI  form.   We’ll  look at  the 
structure  of  AI  in  two  ways:  one  that  focuses  our  attention  on  the  closure  principle  as 
encountered above, and a second that focuses on the alternative hypotheses aspect of AI.  
The AI-type argument is effective because it focuses our attention on the intuition about 
knowledge that  if  q follows from  p  and it’s  the case that  S knows that  p,  then S counts as 
knowing that q.  Say every time the power goes out in my house (p), then my bedside lamp is not 
on (q).  If I know the power is out in my house (p), then I count as also knowing that the bedside 
lamp is not on (q).  Arguments of the AI-type seize upon this aspect of knowledge.  In the way of 
looking  at  the  AI-type  arguments  that  emphasizes  the  closure  principle  we  see  that  these 
arguments place doubt on whether we know something that follows from knowing something 
else.  In the way of looking at the AI-type arguments that emphasizes alternative hypotheses, we 
see that these arguments place doubt on whether we’ve ruled out some alternative to what we 
ordinarily  take  as  knowledge.  In  both  cases,  p refers  to  the  ordinary explanation  for  a 
propositional knowledge claim while q stands for the negation of an extraordinary explanation 
of the claim.  If S know that p, then S knows that q: if S knows that the ordinary proposition is 
the case, then S knows that the extraordinary proposition is not the case (the negation of the 
extraordinary proposition). The argumentative structure of AI can be put like this:
P1. S does not know q
P2. if S does not know q, then S does not know p
C.  S does not know p
Reducing the argument further, removing the representation of knowledge claims and presenting 
the structure in its barest form, gives us:
P1. not-q
P2. if not-q, then not-p
C.  not-p
With “ordinary” for p and “not-extraordinary” for q we get 
P1. not-(not-extraordinary)
P2. if not-(not-extraordinary), then not-(ordinary)
C.  not-(ordinary)
In the way of looking at AI that emphasizes closure, we can see P2 as the contraposition of “if p, 
then q” where if S does not know the consequent  q, then S does not know the antecedent p (a 
case of modus tollens).  In emphasizing this aspect of the argument, it is offered that a subject S 
does not know that q, and that since q follows from p, thus S does not know p.  In the case of 
BIV, if S does not know she’s not a BIV (q), then S does not know she has hands (p), for if S 
were to know she has hands, then S would know she is not a BIV (if p, then q), since a BIV of 
course has no hands.  Likewise, in the case of the painted mules, if S does not know the animals 
are not painted mules (q), then S does not know the animals are zebra (p), for if S were to know 
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the animals were zebra,  then S would know they were not painted mules (if  p,  then  q),  for 
painted mules are of course not zebra.  As we’ve seen, this forces some relevant alternative 
theorists to deny closure.    
In the second way of looking at the AI argument, we focus on the aspect that brings two 
alternative hypotheses, the ordinary and the extraordinary, to the fore and the fact that if you 
cannot  rule  out  the  extraordinary,  i.e.  if  you  don’t  know  that  it’s  not  the  case  that  the 
extraordinary hypothesis obtains, then you can’t claim to know the ordinary proposition.  In this 
way of looking at AI, the emphasis is on how an ordinary belief that we might take to be justified 
on a certain line of evidence is in conflict with an alternative, extraordinary explanation that also 
fits the evidence.  In this sense, what’s at issue in the AI-type argument is “(p or not-q) & not-(p 
& not-q)”: it’s  exclusively either the case that  p (the  ordinary proposition,  and therefore by 
modus ponens, q, the negation of the extraordinary proposition) or it’s the case that not-q (not 
the  negation  of  the  extraordinary proposition28 and  therefore  by  modus  tollens,  not-p,  the 
negation of the ordinary proposition).  So it’s either the ordinary proposition is the case or the 
extraordinary proposition is the case, and since we cannot rule out the extraordinary proposition 
due to its immunity, the argument delivers us with the conclusion that we do not have knowledge 
of the ordinary proposition.  So in both of the skeptical scenarios we’re examining, BIV and the 
painted mules, it  plays out that one claim or the other is correct; you either know what you 
ordinarily take to be knowledge or you do not.  The evidence for thinking I know I have hands is 
either from an external world that includes my hands or the result of an alternative hypothesis 
like the BIV scenario; the evidence for thinking I know that zebra-like animals in a zebra cage 
are zebra is either derived from the fact that the animals are zebra or some alternative hypothesis 
like the painted mules scenario.  These arguments play on the fact that there possibly could be 
another explanation for our epistemic experience. 
Although  they  are  structurally  isomorphic  in  argument  form,  Cohen  significantly 
differentiates the painted mules and BIV scenarios: the painted mules scenario is an example of a 
restricted version of skepticism contrasted with the global BIV scenario.29  As we’ll see, these 
distinctions  hinge  on  the  extent  of  the  neutrality  of  the  evidence  of  each  scenario  and  the 
corresponding immunity of the alternative hypotheses involved.   As will also become clear, the 
variance of knowledge in a range including ordinary and extraordinary accompanies a varying 
degree of  context,  ordinary and skeptical:  in  an ordinary context,  those things that  pass  for 
knowledge are  quite  ordinary,  the  things  people  commonly presume;  in  a  skeptical  context, 
however, when extraordinary hypotheses are being considered, those things that ordinarily pass 
for knowledge fall short of the mark. 
Restricted skepticism is a form of skepticism that applies in a restricted manner, such as a 
line of argument limited to a particular topic (e.g. skepticism about the existence of God) or 
situation (e.g. S doesn’t know the animals that look like zebra aren’t actually painted mules).  In 
these cases, the evidence cited for knowing about the particular topic, situation, or process is 
rendered neutral; the same evidence is simultaneously support for the alternative hypothesis.  
Since any positive evidence for an ordinary claim is neutralized in this manner, Cohen 
tells us that we can appeal outside of the scope of the particular restricted skeptical issue, outside 
of the neutralized domain, and utilize inductive evidence in order to circumvent the skeptic.  In 
regard to the restricted skeptical problem of the painted mules, we can simply appeal to things 
we know inductively about the world, which includes such things as being unfamiliar with any 
28 (In other words, not-q is, following the elimination of the double negation, the extraordinary proposition, itself).
29 Cohen “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Prolems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery,” 67.
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widespread deception occurring in  zoological  exhibits,  especially in such a  crude fashion as 
painting mules.  In the case of another example of restricted skepticism, the papier-mâché barns 
scenario  encountered  earlier,  we  can  generally  appeal  to  inductively  acquired  ordinary 
knowledge about the world: people don’t regularly create fake barns.  We can count as knowing 
the falsity of these hypotheses based on past experience of the behaviors of people, institutions, 
and so on: it’s difficult to imagine the motivation for such schemes.  
Where restricted skepticism is localized, global skepticism is all-encompassing, its reach 
is universal—global.  In a global skeptical situation, sufficient evidence can never be acquired to 
establish  the  falsity  of  the  skeptical  argument—all  evidence  is  neutralized  and the skeptical 
thesis is completely immune to refutation on the grounds of this neutralized evidence.  Witness 
the BIV argument, Cohen’s example of a global skeptical thesis: all evidence remains neutral in 
an attempt to  determine whether  or  not  one is  a  BIV—any appeal  to  empirical  evidence  is 
restricted.  
Restricted and global skepticism are further affected by consideration of context: in what 
sorts  of  context  are  these  hypotheses  entertained?   A restricted  skeptical  argument—on the 
contextualist view—is inconsequential in an ordinary context: by and large a subject can appeal 
to inductive evidence to establish a justified true belief.30  In a skeptical context, however, that 
same argument successfully denies knowledge to the subject—she cannot appeal to inductive 
evidence.  With a global skeptical argument—such as an argument based on the BIV scenario—
no amount of evidence will secure an ordinary claim.
Whereas with cases of restricted skepticism in ordinary contexts a subject can appeal to 
inductive  evidence,  Cohen  initially  insisted  that  with  cases  of  global  skepticism it  is  “non-
evidentially rational” for a subject to deny a skeptical thesis: without any evidence, a subject S 
can deny a global skeptical hypothesis.  “The skeptic would seem to be correct in claiming that 
we do lack evidence against radical skeptical hypotheses,” Cohen acknowledges.  “However, it 
does not follow that it is not reasonable or rational to deny such hypotheses.”31  According to 
Cohen, it can be rational to hold a belief despite not having any evidence for such a belief.32
Cohen noted, however, that it is prima facie odd for a subject to know particular details 
of a world without experience of that world: he recognized that non-evidential rationality leads to 
a-priori contingent knowledge.  To correct this, Cohen found it necessary to conjoin his claim 
that it is rational to deny a global scenario a la non-evidential rationality with empirical evidence 
of  that  world:  the  a priori (non-evidential  rationality)  commingled  with  the  contingent  (the 
empirical evidence).33
And so Cohen’s RA contextualism falls into place: through a variety of considerations we 
can secure knowledge claims in an ordinary context while explaining how skeptical arguments 
destroy  knowledge,  albeit  temporarily.   Cohen’s  analysis  involves  examining  the  type  of 
skeptical  argument  the  argument  is—restricted  skepticism,  global  skepticism,  or  both—and 
showing how the skeptic makes salient an otherwise irrelevant alternative, lifting us out of an 
ordinary context  and  into a  skeptical  one.   With closure,  the normally  irrelevant  alternative 
30 “Thus in everyday contexts, I can know that I don’t see a cleverly-disguised mule, on the basis of the inductive 
evidence I have against such a scenario.” in Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” 66.
31 Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” 112.
32 Stewart  Cohen,  “Contextualist  Solutions  to  Epistemological  Prolems:  Skepticism,  Gettier,  and  the  Lottery,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 68. “Maybe we are unable to demonstrate to a skeptic that our beliefs 
are rational.  But that does not mean that we cannot satisfy ourselves that they are.  If it seems right to say that it is 
to  some  degree  rational…then  we  can  appeal  to  that  fact  in  our  attempt  to  resolve  the  paradox.”  (Cohen, 
“Contextualist Solutionsto Epistemological Prolems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery,” 69).
33 Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Prolems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery,” 76.
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destroys knowledge.  When ordinary knowledge is threatened in a skeptical context, by virtue of 
the extraordinary possibility, the ordinary knowledge is lost; otherwise, what we take ourselves 
to know is safe from challenge, as, depending on the type of skeptical threat, we can appeal 
either to inductive evidence or non-inherent rationality in conjunction with empirical evidence. 
Understanding Cohen’s contextualist solution to the skeptical problems of the painted mules and 
EWS provides a template to be deployed against AI-type skeptical arguments that may come our 
way.
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The Problem of Induction
The  problem  of  induction  is  a  particular  type  of  skeptical  problem  concerned  with  the 
justification of  inductive inferences.   Many philosophers  have  tried to  solve the  problem of 
induction, but no solution has gained wide acceptance.  As we’ve seen, contextualists claim to 
answer another skeptical problem, the problem of the external world.  This suggests that one can 
devise a contextualist solution to the problem of induction.  
A person makes an inductive inference when she expects a future event to occur based on 
past  events  of  the  same sort  having occurred under  sufficiently  similar  conditions—such as 
presuming an A-type event will be paired with a B-type event after witnessing a history of such 
pairings.  We make this type of inference all the time: thinking the sun will rise in the morning; 
relying  on  gravity  to  pull  a  ball  tossed  up  back  down  again;  expecting  bread  to  provide 
nourishment.34 However, David Hume raised the question of whether one can provide a rational 
basis  for  a  belief  in  induction,  despite  the  apparent  widespread success  of  these  inferences. 
Hume provides an argument against the possibility of justifying induction; the effects of this 
argument are enough to merit the “problem of induction” to become known by some as “Hume’s 
problem.” 35  In this section my main aim is to set out the problem of induction, whether we can 
be  justified  in  extrapolating  general  inductive  conclusions  from  corresponding  inductive 
premises.   To this  end I  will  explain Hume’s argument  against  induction.   In the following 
section I will consider the fallout if Hume’s argument is indeed correct. 
Justification Requirement and Inductive Inference
The traditional three-part account of knowledge requires a knower to have a justified belief that 
is true.  A subject S knows some proposition  p just in case S believes that  p, S is justified in 
believing that p, and p is actually true. 36  I will understand justification in regard to induction to 
require having satisfactory reasons to hold a belief acquired through inductive inference.  As an 
instance of such inductive reasoning, we might believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it 
has reliably done so in the past, and this belief very well might be true—let’s say for argument 
the sun is going to rise tomorrow.  But this leaves the justification of this true belief in question: 
on what grounds are we justified in going beyond premises (past events) to some conclusion (a 
future event, something that is not yet an experience)?  Laurence Bonjour recommends viewing 
the  collected  instances  of  observed  inductive  evidence  as  comprising  a  “standard  inductive 
premise” and the conclusion we draw solely on the information in this premise as a “standard 
inductive conclusion.”37  The problem of induction is the challenge to justify the leap from the 
standard  inductive  premise  to  the  standard  inductive  conclusion:  what  is  the  rationale  for 
concluding from all observations of the sun’s rising, the inductive premise, that it will do so yet 
again, the inductive conclusion?  As we will see from Hume’s argument, there appears to be an 
additional,  tacit  assumption that  begs  the question in  arguments to  justify  induction,  a  tacit  
premise in the space between the inductive premise and inductive conclusion that assumes the 
very point at issue.
34 This last example is  one of Hume’s examples.  David Hume,  An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 114.
35 Howson, Colin. Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief (New York: Oxford University  Press, 
2003), 10.
36 Again, I’m here setting aside any Gettier-type concerns.  
37 Laurence Bonjour, Epistemology: classic problems and contemporary responses (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 56.
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Hume recognizes  two types  of  knowledge:  a priori and  a posteriori. 38  Given  this, 
Hume’s  argument  against  justifying  induction  takes  the  form  of  a  dilemma:  any  proposed 
solution to the problem of induction must rest on a priori grounds or a posteriori grounds.  As 
Hume  intends  to  show  induction  to  be  unjustified,  Hume  qua skeptic  must  show  that  an 
argument justifying inductive inferences can not be justified by a priori or a posteriori means. 
Before looking at Hume’s argument we will look at what constitutes a case of inductive 
inference, how we presume the future will resemble the past, in more detail.  Consistently paired 
types of events lead us to infer the continued pairing of these types of events: an A-type event 
followed by a B-type event leads us to expect the B-type event when we encounter the A-type 
event.  As a result of encountering these event types in tandem, we develop the (generally tacit) 
belief that if an A-type event occurs then a B-type event will follow: events of this sort will 
unfold in the future in the same manner as events of this sort have unfolded in the past.  When it 
has rained in the past, the pavement on my street has gotten wet.  If looking out the window I see 
that it is beginning to rain, I inductively infer that the pavement is going to get wet in the same 
way it has each time before.  Hume’s argument challenges this common sense expectation.  The 
tacit  premise  common  sense  relies  upon  to  go  from  observed  particular  events  to  general 
inductive conclusions must be either justified on a priori or  a posteriori grounds—if it can be 
justified at all.  We’ll look at the trouble Hume takes an a priori justification of induction to face. 
Hume explains that “The mind can always  conceive any effect from any cause, and…
whatever we  conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense.”39  For an argument to be 
justified on a priori grounds the conjunction of the premises and the negation of the conclusion 
must not be metaphysically possible.  That is, on Hume’s view, an argument is a priori justified 
where if the conclusion was denied it would contradict the premise(s).40  In justifying induction, 
an a priori justification runs aground because it is possible that what inductive premises lead us 
to expect might not occur: that which has been regular quite simply might change and this will 
not contradict the prior events.  A possible event, no matter how unlikely its occurrence might 
seem, can not be ruled out.  
Most contemporary philosophers hold that Hume requires deductive validity for a priori 
justification.41  By this interpretation, in order to justify inductive inferences on a priori grounds 
one must demonstrate that the inference is logically entailed by the premises.  It is important to 
stress here that an argument attempting to justify induction on a priori grounds would thus have 
to be demonstrably correct by virtue of its premises alone; it would have to be shown that a 
belief in induction is rational by an appeal to deductive proof alone.42  We can look at the rain 
scenario to see how this works.
38 Although Hume does use the term  a priori in the  Treatise and the  Enquiry,  the designations a priori and ‘a 
posteriori’ come after Hume.  Hume referred to “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”: “All reasonings may be 
divided into two kinds.” (Hume, “Enquiry,” 115). In Hume’s terminology, this is demonstrative (a priori deductive 
reasoning)  or  probable (a  posteriori—reasoning  by  reference  to  experience).   For  clarity  I  use  the  current 
terminology, ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori.’
Charles Landesman presents Hume’s division as such: on a priori, “Hume claims that such truths do not 
bring with them any ontological commitments; they imply nothing about any existing objects; the mind operating 
independently of experience, has no way of gaining access to any objects at all.”  Charles Landesman, Skepticism: 
the central issues (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 143.
Landesman presents the a posteriori as facts that can be verified “by experience and that imply ontological 
commitments.  These are neither intuitive nor demonstrable because their existence is contingent.” Landesman, 143.
39 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 410.
40 Bonjour, 59.
41 “According to Hume, any true proposition about the relations among our ideas is provable by deduction, because 
its negation will imply a contradiction.” Landesman, 143.  
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It would take an extraordinary turn of events for it to rain in my neighborhood and the 
pavement not to get wet.  But we can easily conceive of such a circumstance.  For example, it’s 
possible—if not probable—that rain could fall from the sky and slip into another dimension just 
as it was about to reach the street.  This scenario shows that it’s possible for it to rain in my 
neighborhood without  the  pavement  on my street  getting wet.   Despite  the  seemingly  good 
reasons we have for expecting a B-type event to follow an A-type, it’s metaphysically possible 
that we could have the one, the A-type event, without the other, the B-type event, following. 
The pavement could remain dry on a rainy day.
So, as we can conceive that things can change—rain slipping into another dimension—
intuitively we can recognize that an appeal to past events to justify belief in a future event can 
not  provide  a  priori justification  for  induction.   As  Hume  puts  it,   “that  there  are  no 
demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the 
course of nature may change.”43  Inductive inference is therefore not justified on a priori grounds 
and the tacit premise therefore doesn’t consist of a priori justification.  This leaves a posteriori 
justification to be considered.  For if it is not through reason alone, Hume tells us, then rather it 
must be through experience that we can justify inductive inferences—that is, if they are justified 
at all.  
In attempting to justify our belief in the correctness of inductive inferences, then, the 
other tact  to take is to argue from experience, on  a posteriori grounds.  The common sense 
response to the problem of induction is to point to the innumerable instances where belief in 
induction seems to have paid off: the sun actually rising, objects tossed up falling back down 
again, the cases of bread providing nourishment, and so on.  A more sophisticated version of this 
common sense approach is to argue that we can 1) review a sufficient number of past cases 
where a variety of conclusions based on corresponding inductive premises were found true; 2) 
justifiably infer from 1 that these many particular cases of induction can justify a belief in a 
general,  law-like  inductive  thesis;  and  3)  use  this  general  inductive  thesis  to  justify  future 
particular cases where we expect B-type cases to follow A-type cases.44  
This a posteriori approach doesn’t get one as far as it might first seem to suggest.  There 
are two problems with the approach: an attempt to verify step 1 will never succeed as one could 
never be in an epistemic position to observe all of the future, past, present, and possible elements 
in the various inductive conclusions.  To take one example, one could never verify all (future, 
past, present, and possible) instances where a medium-sized body was affected by gravity.45  The 
second issue facing an a posteriori justification for induction is that to justify inferring a general 
inductive thesis  based on an appeal  to experience (in steps 1 and 2)  is  itself  an example of  
inductive  inference:  in  order  to  justify  making  an  inductive  inference  we  are  inferring 
inductively, begging the very question at issue.  In short, the reason given to justify a particular 
inductive inference is  itself inductive.   The tacit  premise we identified earlier  is playing the 
question-begging  role—we  are  using  the  tacit  premise  in  the  argument  to  justify  the  tacit 
premise.  But this strictly forbidden.  In Hume’s words, “our experience in the past can be a 
proof  of  nothing for  the  future  but  upon a  supposition,  that  there is  a  resemblance  betwixt 
them.”46  But it is this supposition, the tacit premise, for which we require justification. 
42 But, as Howson explains, “Hume commences by pointing out that no inference from the observed to the as-yet 
unobserved is deductive.” In Howson, 11.
43 Hume, Enquiry, 115.
44 Bonjour, 60.
45 Hume does not mention this first problem: it is taken from Bonjour, 60. 
46 Hume, Treatise, 410.
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Examining the rainy day case, we get a better understanding of this second difficulty 
faced by an a posteriori justification of induction.  We come to expect the pavement to get wet in 
a rain shower because, based on experience, that’s precisely what’s happened when it’s rained in 
the past.  We can point to many cases for support.  What Hume asks for here is to identify where 
exactly we’re getting the justification to make such an inference; where in the range of cases of 
B-type events following A-type events do we find the means to project into the future that a yet-
to-occur B-type event will follow this A-type event? In the case of the rainy day, for all observed 
instances when it’s rained the pavement has gotten wet and from this it is inferred that it shall do 
so likewise in the future.  In an attempt to justify this inference, we must reach farther than the 
particular instances where it has rained on my block.  Eventually we are pressed to justify the 
general thesis.  The move here is to invoke other instances of the sort that support a general 
belief in inductive inference, instances like bread nourishing or the sun rising.  The thought is 
that one can justifiably rely on this particular conclusion because it fits within a larger schema of 
inductive inferences that seem to work quite well.  The argument becomes: I can justifiably infer 
that the rain shower in my neighborhood will wet the pavement on my street because 1) it has 
done so every time I’ve observed it rain in my neighborhood and this is an instance where many 
particulars  of  a  specific  sort  can  justify  a  corresponding,  inductive  conclusion;  2)  inductive 
inferences  like  this  are  justified  in  general  because  we  can  point  to  the  numerous  A-type 
followed by B-type cases that resemble the rainy day scenario (the sun rising, gravity’s effect on 
medium-sized bodies, bread nourishing…) for support; and 3) one can justifiably infer from this 
general inductive thesis that a future event of a sort will resemble previous cases of that sort, in 
this case that the rain shower in my neighborhood will wet the pavement on my street because it 
has done so every time I’ve observed it rain in my neighborhood.  
We can see that the a posteriori argument to justify an inductive inference presumes the 
very tacit  premise it’s  trying to  demonstrate.   One way to  frame this   issue is  in  terms of 
evidence:  the  approach  begs  the  question  about  inductive  inference  based  on  evidence  by 
pointing to evidence in order to provide grounds for inductive inference.  This approach—and 
Hume tells us any a posteriori approach—uses induction to justify induction, which is circular. 
Anyone who attempts to argue in this way, he says, “must be evidently going in a circle, and 
taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.”47  For if faced only with limited 
knowledge, any conclusion about future events is one gained by the following presupposition: 
instances of past events grant the ability to anticipate the recurrence of such an event. 
We can thus formulate in a neater form the two prongs of Hume’s argument:
1) An  a  priori attempt  to  justify  induction  requires  that  a  contradiction  results  from 
maintaining  premises  and  negating  the  conclusion.   But  there  is  no  contradiction  in 
asserting that the future might change.
2) An a posteriori attempt to justify induction presupposes that the future will be like the 
past, making the very inference that it attempts to justify, thus begging the question.
On the first,  it’s not contradictory to suppose a belief in induction is false.  On the second, 
making  an  appeal  to  any  evidence  of  past  inductive  success  presupposes  that  we  can  have 
prescience based on experience, the question at issue.   Hume therefore seems well-equipped to 
deny attempts to justify induction through either a priori or a posteriori means.
47 Hume, Enquiry, 115.
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Consequences: Scientific and Personal
Hume wrote the Treatise with the expressed intent of becoming the Isaac Newton of the mind. 48 
There’s some irony here.   For,  in his project Hume appears to undermine the very basis  of 
scientific  success.  As  we’ve  seen,  Hume  convincingly  argues  against  any  justification  of 
induction.   Thus,  Hume’s  work  on  “inference,”  “probable  arguments”,  and  “reason  from 
experience”49 seems with its evident paradoxes to carry a serious task for science to reformulate 
its theoretical basis.  Moreover, his argument reaches beyond the laboratory: it is fundamental to 
human life that conclusions about the world can be drawn and applied over a range of space and 
time; his argument threatens even our most basic beliefs: anytime we rely on a regular feature of 
the world we do so based on an inductive inference, whether the inference is articulated or not. 
We’ll look first at the scientific consequences and then at the mundane, personal consequences.
If we were to take a complex system of physical events, such as the astronomical activity 
involved in the sun’s apparent rising, and whittle it down to more basic elements, it would appear 
that we had found at root basic tendencies of the physical objects in the system.  And (quite 
naturally it seems) we would have a most solid expectation of the continued existence of these 
causal laws—both particularly and universally.   This presumed knowledge is  implicit  in our 
daily lives, where we work into the quotient of our physical movements the steadfast presence of 
gravity, for example.  But it is an explicit component of science.
There are  two basic processes in scientific information gathering: the summative and 
ampliative.50  The former involves a claim about a group as a whole based on the inspection of its 
component members.  A sample of emeralds might be collected and properties such as the color, 
hardness, density, and chemical composition measured with the greatest precision. Conclusions 
such as that emeralds are green with a density of such-and-such are made, this information is 
compiled, and a summary record is then available for other scientists to consult.  
An  instance  of  an  ampliative  process  might  consist  of  utilizing  some of  this  stored 
information for its predictive or explanatory power.  An ornithologist might evaluate the pigment 
found in the wings of ravens and, in addition to drawing conclusions as to the color properties of 
raven feathers, the scientist then might further amplify this basic information to include cases in 
the potential future or the most remote past.  The qualities analyzed in the pigment might reveal 
to  the  scientist  how  ravens  have  fared  in  different  climates  in  ages  past  or  perhaps  the 
composition of the pigment bears a certain reactive quality that can be realized for an industrial 
use: non-fading dyes, a catalyst in alumina reactions, or a general product that will find its way 
into everyone’s home.  We see in this way how basic information can be extracted and applied to 
unlimited cases future and past, well beyond the particular experience in which the information 
was gathered.   
It  is  with  this  ampliative  induction  that  science  has  known  its  greatest  triumphs. 
Abstracting  generalizations  from particular  instances  and  applying  this  knowledge  to  other, 
discrete, particular instances not only keeps humans upright and their thirsts quenched, but the 
careful  measurements  and  thorough  evaluation  of  data  has  also  led  to  predictions  of  lunar 
eclipses and expeditions to the very surface of the moon.  And with the advent of quantum 
mechanics, predictive power of the utmost precision has been gained.
48 S.J Frederick Copleston,  A History of Philosophy Volume V (New York: Doubleday, 1994),.261.
49 Hume never used the word ‘induction’ as we’re using it here (although Bacon and Locke did).  Livingston, D.W.; 
J.T. King, Hume : A Re-Evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), 69-70.
50 Jonathan L. Cohen,  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), 9-10.
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But, as we saw above in Hume’s analysis, what we have grown to expect may one day 
cease or change: despite what we might think likely, it is theoretically possible that a fair coin 
might  consistently  land  heads.51  We have  no  rationale  for  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  the 
otherwise, no matter how many events witnessed or heard about, no matter how many specimens 
collected and examined.  
This strikes an awkward chord.  This is just how we know, comes the response. We test 
and test, and then we conclude.  This aspect of the inductive inference is known as enumerative 
induction: the tendency to extrapolate from many instances of particulars a general conclusion, 
with the greater amount supposedly supporting more strongly this inference, the larger number 
increasing  the probability  of  whatever  is  in  question.   This  has  been the  basis  of  empirical 
science.   But,  Hume appears to  have revealed,  that  there  is  a  lingering problem behind the 
seeming successes of science and indeed our daily habits.  If Hume is correct, then there is no 
rational justification for what we ordinarily take to be given.  As Bonjour starkly explains: “if 
inductive inference is unjustified, so all apparently are all such scientific beliefs [explanations for 
patterns or regularities].”52  By this light, a fundamental part of our lives is without any rational 
basis. 
Science depends on the continued success of its research and analysis, explanations and 
predictions.  Reliability and predictability are its hallmarks.  Causal laws and past evidence are 
relied upon throughout technology, the implementation of scientific discovery.  This of course 
impacts our personal lives through, among other things, manufactured equipment, the food we 
consume, and the energy we use.  As we’ve seen, though, there are more personal, less refined 
ways that we use induction.  Merely the participation in our daily lives without suddenly reeling 
into chaos depends on and instantiates our faith in these inferences.  Our nourishment, our basic 
safety,  our  ability  to  walk  across  the  room or  use  language:  these  all  clearly  depend  upon 
inductive inferences.  Any evidence about the past is rendered void and ineffective. Empirical 
evidence as a concept becomes meaningless: the evidence cannot be used as evidence, nothing 
can be  taken as  a  reliable  indicator  of  anything.   As Bonjour  asks,  if  Hume is  correct  and 
induction is unjustified,
how could  I  be  justified  in  thinking  that  any  of  these  sorts  of 
alleged evidence are genuinely reliable indicators of the sorts of 
events they are alleged to be evidence for without relying in some 
way on  inductively  established  generalizations  pertaining  to  the 
relations  between  such  events  and  the  production  of  the 
corresponding evidence…?53
Indeed on this account we don’t seem to be justified in making knowledge claims about the 
external world.  Many argue also that we cannot even assert with full confidence that an external 
world exists, whatever properties we may want to assign to it.54  Without the knowledge that our 
inductive  inferences  are  correct,  we seem capsized,  left  with  little  but  doubt,  paranoia,  and 
51 This possible world can be made our world.  According to Daniel Dennett, with 1,024 participants in a ten-round 
elimination coin-toss tournament, one person is bound to successively win ten successive coin tosses.  Using this 
method, there can presumably be made-to-order a winner of any desired length of random coin-tosses Daniel C. 
Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: evolution and the meaning of life (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 54.
52 “Thus if  inductive  inference is  unjustified,  so all  apparently  are  all  such scientific  beliefs  [explanations for 




solipsism.  As Russell succinctly put it, “If this were not known to us, we could never extend our 
knowledge beyond the sphere of our private experience; and this sphere, as we have seen, is 
exceedingly limited.”55  
Faced with such a situation, it is clear that there is great motivation to assert the contrary, 
great intuitive compulsion to say we  can make such inductive inferences.  The philosophical 
skeptic, on the other hand, is appropriately skeptical of any success in this matter.
55 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press), 60.
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A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Induction
The problem of induction is another argument from ignorance; as such, we have very good 
reason to expect that a contextualist solution to the problem of induction can be constructed 
along the same lines as our solutions to the AI arguments based on the BIV and painted mules 
scenarios.  In this section, I develop a contextualist solution to the problem of induction and 
assess the success of that solution. 
We’ve seen that the problem of induction is a skeptical problem, but moreover it is also 
an argument from ignorance. 56  Recall that the central feature of these arguments is that the 
skeptic  presents  us  with  an  alternative  hypothesis—some other  explanation  to  the  observed 
phenomena—that we are unable to rule out.  In the case of BIV, we can’t rule out the possibility 
that we are a BIV and, because of open possibilities for explanation, are therefore unable to grant 
knowledge of knowing we have hands. 
In the problem of induction, we can’t rule out there is some other explanation 
aside  from induction—for  example,  all  of  the  past  correlated  events  could  be  the  result  of 
random  chance (RC,  where  RC  indicates  random  chance  has  until  now  provided  for  the 
appearance of a regular predictive feature(s) of the world).  A consequence of Hume’s argument 
is that if this alternative hypothesis RC cannot be ruled out—and as the course of nature could 
possibly change,  it  cannot  be—then it  follows that one cannot justifiably make an inductive 
inference.  
Let’s  put  Hume’s  problem in  the  AI schematic  form we’ve  already developed.   We 
already have RC as an alternative to induction (H in the schematic form).  We’ll also need a 
restricted example of what we ordinarily take to be the case—O in the schematic form.  An O is 
a particular aspect that follows from the generally accepted thesis (in the BIV scenario, the O is 
having hands, which we would know if we were to know that we were not a BIV).  Tossing a 
tennis  ball  up  and expecting  it  to  fall  down again  (TB)  is  a  specific,  restricted  instance  of 
inductive inference and will serve our purposes.
P1. I do not know that not-RC.
P2. If I do not know that not-RC, then I do not know that TB.
C. I do not know that TB.
With the problem of induction in its AI schematic form, we can begin to see how a contextualist 
solution suggests itself.  We can look back at how Cohen tackled EWS to see how a contextualist 
solution to the problem of induction should proceed.
Recall the template we developed in our analysis of Cohen’s solution to EWS.  A Cohen-
based contextualist solution to the skeptical argument against induction proceeds in the same 
way: the solution evaluates the type of skeptical argument it  is—restricted skepticism, global 
skepticism, or both—and establishes the (ordinary and skeptical) contexts in which the argument 
operates,  identifying  how  the  skeptic  makes  salient  an  otherwise  irrelevant  alternative  and 
through the operation of the closure principle makes the conclusion seem irrefutable.  Once this 
analysis gives us the component pieces, we can follow through with the contextualist explanation 
of the skeptical argument and determine how our ordinary knowledge is safe from the challenge.
56Hume’s problem is an ideal candidate, for it is, as Bonjour has commented, “an exceptionally clear example of the 
general form epistemological problems typically take.” Bonjour, 56.
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The  AI  argument  in  the  problem  of  induction  involves  both  a  restricted  form  of 
skepticism—a challenge to the expectation that the tennis ball tossed up will fall down again—
and a global form of skepticism—that an induction-undermining alternative is the case and thus 
inductive  inferences  are  made  without  justification.    This  yields  a  universally  threatening 
challenge to inductive-based knowledge, one that can extend to other restricted particulars: the 
example of the tennis ball can be replaced with another process or event where we regularly 
apply inductive inference.   Note,  also,  that  the presence of  both global  and restricted forms 
conveniently fits with Cohen’s analytical tools—we can deploy his analysis in full force, tackling 
both the restricted and global aspects of this problem.
In a restricted form of skepticism, Cohen tells us that when in an ordinary context we can 
appeal to inductive evidence gathered from past events to deny the particular, restricted skeptical 
threat: a subject can justifiably assert the zebra-like animals to be zebra based on experience of 
zoos,  animals,  and other  related things.   By the  same token,  in  the  case of  the  problem of 
induction, we can rely on experience playing the game of tennis to justifiably expect a tennis ball 
tossed up to come back down.  If the ball has come back down every time I’ve tossed it for a 
serve this afternoon (and there is no skeptical argument present), then I can claim “when I toss 
this ball up it will come back down” with full justification. 
For a restricted scenario in a skeptical context, however, that same justification is lacking. 
Earlier we saw that in the painted mules scenario, a subject in a skeptical context could  not 
justifiably claim to know the zebra-like animals to be zebra.  The skeptic has made salient the 
possibility  of  an  otherwise  improbable  alternative,  and  through  the  closure  principle  this 
undermines our knowledge of the particular case in question.  
Recall that on Cohen’s view it is inherently rational to deny the purchase of a global 
skeptical argument when in an ordinary context; this is particularly emboldened (and, as we saw, 
serves to allow Cohen to avoid  a priori contingent  knowledge) when we combine this  with 
empirical evidence.  We saw in the global form of EWS—the argument from BIV—that Cohen 
holds it to be inherently rational to deny BIV (combined with empirical evidence of hands to 
account for contingent knowledge).  It is likewise in the case of the problem of induction.  On 
Cohen’s line of argument, it is inherently rational in an ordinary context to insist that a subject is 
justified in presuming the world to consist of measurable, predictable processes and events (and, 
in light of Cohen’s concern, couple this with evidence of having seen the process in effect—TB, 
for example). It is irrational on Cohen’s line of thinking to disbelieve the validity of inductive 
inference, particularly when one can point to such instances as TB.  In this way, Cohen preserves 
justification for relying globally on inductive inference in an ordinary context.  
In  a  skeptical  context,  however,  the  force  of  the  global  skeptical  argument  is  not 
tempered—knowledge is undermined: a subject cannot justifiably rely on inductive inferences. 
Just as BIV globally destroys knowledge about an external world, so does an argument based on 
RC deny a subject’s ability to knowledgeably predict  an occurrence of an event based upon 
experience.
According to our analysis, then, the skeptic makes the normally irrelevant alternative RC 
relevant by making it salient, and thus, through the closure principle, knowledge is destroyed, as 
evidenced by  our  loss  of  TB.   As Cohen would have  it,  though,  this  does  not  destroy our 
knowledge of induction as a reliable process simpliciter.  It is only in the skeptical context that 
we  are  not  justified  in  relying  on  inductive  inference;  in  a  more  ordinary  context,  we  can 
justifiably rely upon these processes we take for granted everyday.
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Our contextualist  solution to  the problem of induction does just  what  we expected a 
solution  to  do:  it  preserves  the  knowledge  claims  under  consideration  while  valuing  our 
intuitions  about  knowledge—it  seems  correct  to  both  deny  and  assert  justified,  true  belief 
depending on the context.  The apparent threat is defused, our knowledge is secure, and the 
closure principle is upheld.  A successful contextualist solution to Hume’s problem evaluates its 
efficacy in terms of contexts,  establishes the plausibility of the propositions and the shifting 
contexts  involved in  the arguments  success,  and this  seems precisely what  our  contextualist 
solution to the problem of induction does.57  But there is a problem—two problems: namely, the 
horns of Hume’s problem.
The Two Horns
Recall that the dilemma of Hume’s problem is that you must solve the problem of induction by 
either  a priori or  a posteriori means, but that neither are viable routes to justifying induction. 
Notice that this means that you cannot rely on  a priori  rationality to justify induction (for as 
we’ve seen, there is no contradiction involved with a change in the course of nature) and, on the 
other  hand,  one  of  course  cannot  appeal  to  empirical  evidence  either  (as  this  relies  upon 
inductive inference).  Cohen’s contextualism, when deployed to solve the problem of induction, 
clearly violates these restrictions: it explicitly appeals to induction in the restricted scenario and 
explicitly appeals to rationality in the global.  The component of Cohen’s contextualism that 
establishes knowledge in the face of a global scenario—that it is inherently rational to deny the 
skeptical  hypothesis—is  an  a  priori argument.   The  component  of  Cohen’s  argument  that 
establishes  knowledge  in  the  face  of  a  restricted  skeptical  scenario—that  we  can  appeal  to 
inductive evidence—is an a posteriori argument.  
These are precisely the two approaches Hume has shown to be deficient in attempting to 
refute his problem.  Additionally, recall that the first component bothered Cohen with its result 
of a priori contingent knowledge.  To remedy this, he asserted that one must combine inherent 
rationality  with  empirical  evidence.   As  we’ve  established  in  our  treatment  of  induction, 
however, empirical evidence entails inferring inductively.  With this addition, the global scenario 
alone—in the case of the problem of induction, a hypothesis that undermines justification for 
inductive inference— now violates both horns of Hume’s argument.   So,  even when Cohen 
bolsters his non-evidential rationality with inductive evidence, he is still begging the question.
These  background  assumptions  might  be  acceptable  with  EWS,  but  in  the  case  of 
inductive skepticism, they undermine the conclusion.  Cohen’s contextualism fails as a solution 
to the problem of induction: when his contextualism is put against the problem, you get Hume’s 
problem all over again.
One who sympathizes with contextualism might argue that the contextualist analysis is 
designed only for EWS and examples like the painted mules and papier-mâché barns.  But this 
doesn’t fly, for as I have shown, the problem of induction is of the same AI type as the other 
arguments.  Even if we were to grant this ad hoc exemption, however, there is still a lingering 
problem: through the problem of induction alone, we can generate EWS.  This suggests that, at 
minimum, these two issues are conceptually entangled, which would require from a contextualist 
an explanation for why we should consider them to be separate, and, at maximum, it suggests 
57 The first premise creates a skeptical context.  The second premise can occur in a skeptical or ordinary context, 
since for the contextualist this instance of the closure principle states a logical truth that follows independent of 
context.  The conclusion is  valid only in a skeptical context.  When the skeptical  argument is  not  present, the 
skeptical context is not maintained, and the conclusion has no purchase.
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that,  at  least  for a relevant alternatives contextualism like Cohen’s, none of the contextualist 




In this paper I have argued that a contextualist solution to the problem of induction built on the 
work of Stewart Cohen is untenable.  The “External World Skepticism” section explained the 
skeptical problem of the external world, showing that the skeptic denies we have the justification 
we normally presume to have for knowledge claims about an external world.  The following 
section explained Stewart Cohen’s contextualist argument against EWS, the upshot of which is 
that depending upon the context, the standards for justification for knowledge claims differ and 
therefore, although knowledge of a proposition is lost in a skeptical context, knowledge of the 
same proposition is secure in an ordinary context.  The following section outlined the problem of 
induction and then  in  “A Contextualist  Solution  to  the  Problem of  Induction” we saw how 
utilizing our earlier analysis of Cohen’s contextualist solution to EWS we were able to construct 
a  similar  solution  to  the  problem of  induction.   In  the  end,  though,  we  saw that  there  are 
particular  problems with  Cohen’s  contextualism that  invalidate  an  attempted  solution  to  the 
problem  of  induction.   If  my  arguments  are  correct,  this  further  suggests  that  Cohen’s 
contextualism—and any theory similar to Cohen’s—must account for the problem of induction 
in a contextualist solution to EWS.  This perhaps too suggests that contextualism in general may 
contain some significant deficiencies—even beyond its explicit question-begging.  
Contextualism has many champions and many detractors.  Some dismiss its concerns as 
epistemologically  irrelevant.   Others  focus  on  its  practice  of  openly  begging  the  question, 
questioning its philosophical relevance.  If Cohen’s contextualism could have been successfully 
deployed against the problem of induction, then this would have bolstered the contextualist thesis 
in  general.   However,  as  we’ve  seen  the  presumptions  in  Cohen’s  theory  prevent  it  from 
successfully addressing the problem of induction, we should weigh whether or not this adds to 
the detractors column in the debate on contextualism’s relevance.  Cohen’s failure here should 
not be taken to damn contextualism outright, but it certainly recommends examining other forms 
of  contextualism  in  light  of  Cohen’s  and  strongly  speaks  against  an  RA-based  form  of 
contextualism.
I’ve suggested ways in which the contextualist might respond to my criticism, but I’ll 
also note here that one can see a built-in safety feature in contextualism: it seems a contextualist 
will attempt to avail  herself of a contextualist  defense from critics  of contextualism.  In the 
context of skepticism about contextualism, a contextualist  might nod assent—the criticism is 
accurate in that context.  But allow the lax standards to resume and the contextualist can say by 
these everyday standards contextualism just seems right.  In the specific case of justification for 
ordinary knowledge claims,  the contextualist  will  try  to say that  only by investigating these 
claims  in  light  of  epistemology  (the  practice  of  which  David  Lewis  suggests  undermines 
knowledge) does this  requirement for justification pose a  problem.  In an everyday context, 
where we aren’t skeptical about everyday knowledge claims, and truth is gauged by the way we 
use words, the contextualist will say that our claims are safe.  The contextualist seems to think 
herself in quite an untouchable position (despite our skepticism about such a position).   But 




Black,  Tim.  “Contextualism  in  Epistemology,”  The  Internet  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/contextu.htm (Accessed September 2004).
Bonjour,  Laurence.   Epistemology: classic problems and contemporary responses (Lanham,  
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002).
Cohen, L. Jonathan.  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: 1989).
Cohen, Stewart.  “Knowledge and Context,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 582.
Cohen, Stewart.  “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 113.
Cohen, Stewart. “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Prolems: Skepticism, Gettier, and 
the Lottery,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998):
Cohen,  Stewart.  “Contextualism,  Skepticism,  and  the  Structure  of  Reasons,”  Philosophical  
Perspectives 13 (1999).
Copleston, S.J Frederick.  A History of Philosophy Volume V (New York: Doubleday, 1994).
Dennett, Daniel C.  Darwin’s Dangerous Idea:  evolution and the meaning of life (New York: 
Touchstone, 1995).
Descartes, Rene.  Selected Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press,  
1998).
Dretske, Fred.  “Epistemic Operators” in Skepticism: a contemporary reader, ed. DeRose, Keith 
and Warfield, Ted A.  (New York: Oxford, 1999). 
Howson, Colin. Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).
Hume, David.  A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Hume,  David.   An Enquiry  Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford:  Oxford University  
Press, 1999).
Kornblith, Hilary.  “The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology,” Philosophical Issues (Nous), 
10 (2000).
Landesman, Charles.  Skepticism: the central issues (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).
Putnam, Hilary.  Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1981).
27
Livingston, D.W.; King, J.T.  Hume : A Re-Evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1976).
Pryor,  James.  “Highlights  of  Recent  Epistemology,”  British  Journal  for  the  Philosophy  of  
Science 52 (2001).
Russell, Bertrand.  The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
Schiffer,  Stephen.   “Contextualist  Solutions to  Skepticism,”  Proceedings  of  the Aristotelian  
Society 96 (1996): 317-333.
Sosa,  Ernest.  “Knowledge in  Context,  Skepticism in  Doubt,”  Philosophical  Perspectives 2  
(1988): 139-155.
Stanley, Jason.  “Context and Logical Form,” Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2000): 391-434.
28
Vita
William Galloway Osborne III is an artist, writer, musician, teacher, and thinker who recognizes 
the pretentiousness inherent in these types of designations.  He has a lovely, smart wife named 
Annie and a handsome grey cat named Isaac (after the Woody Allen character in  Manhattan). 
He has earned a terminal degree in painting; taught at the primary, secondary, and university 
level in a variety of disciplines; and cooks in the Thai, Indian, Latin, and Continental traditions. 
He aspires to live in a functional community with an agreeable climate along the lines of San 
Francisco, New York, Boston, Paris, or Geneva.  Meanwhile he attempts to temper ambition 
with gratitude and to practice equanimity in the face of ephemera.     
29
